CAN THE INTRODUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
RECONSIDERATION COMMITTEES HELP REFORM
CHINA’S SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE
RECONSIDERATION?
Yang Weidong*

I. OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION IN CHINA. 107
II. A NEW EXPERIMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION
COMMITTEES ...................................................................... 114
III. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ARC MODEL ................. 120
IV. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARC MODEL ................... 124
A. What Should Be the Status of ARCs? .............................. 125
B. Where Should ARCs Be Located? ................................... 126
C. Who Should Be the Full-time and Part-time Members of
ARCs? ........................................................................... 128
D. How Does the New Arrangement that Reviewing Agency
Should Basically Serve as the Defendant in
Administrative Litigation Influence ARCs ? ................... 130
V. THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION IN
CHINA................................................................................. 134

I. OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION IN
CHINA
In modern society, providing sufficient remedies to people
adversely affected by administrative decisions is fundamental to the
rule of law and social justice.1It is generally accepted that there
*

Professor, Chinese Academy of Governance. Thanks to Neysun Mahboubi and
Aaron Gingrande for their valuable comments and suggestions.
1
See H.W.R. WADE, TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 3 (1963) (explaining social
justice and the importance of the law and consequences).
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should be a chain of remedies to settle disputes between citizens and
their government.2 In China, as elsewhere, there are a range of
informal (non-adjudicative) remedies and formal legal remedies.
Informal remedies mainly comprise (1) recourse to People’s
Congress deputies at all levels, (2) petitioning to “letters and visits”
(xinfang) offices, and (3) direct appeal to agency decision-makers.
Chinese citizens have two formal ways to challenge agency
decisions:
administrative
litigation
and
administrative
reconsideration.
Administrative litigation, providing judicial review of
agency action, was formally introduced in China by the passage of
the Administrative Litigation Law (“ALL”) in 1989, which was
revised in November 2014 and July 2017.3 Of course, this channel
plays an important role in the resolution of disputes between
Chinese citizens and their government (hereinafter “administrative
disputes”), and in providing remedies to aggrieved citizens. But,
taking into account the considerable costs, time and effort involved,
administrative litigation may normally be considered a last resort.
Therefore, administrative reconsideration has been made available
as an alternative, less costly, and less time-intensive method of
formal dispute resolution.
In administrative reconsideration, the adjudicator is an
administrative agency, not an external court. However, to hold to
the basic tenet of justice and fairness that “no one should be a judge
2
SeePETER LEYLAND & GORDON ANTHONY, TEXTBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15
(5th ed. 2005) (stating that the government needs to be able to be held accountable by the
people as well as people being held accountable to the government).
3
Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法)
[Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic of
China, Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990, amended Nov. 1, 2014 and Jul.1, 2017) 1989
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 2 (China) [hereinafter ALL]; see also He
Haibo, How Much Progress Can a Legislation Bring?: The 2014 Amendment of the
Administrative Litigation Law of PRC, 13U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(explaining Administrative Litigation Law and how it is drafted); Wang Jing, Revision of
China’s Administrative Litigation Law and Prospects for Expanding Judicial Review to
Normative Documents, U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (explaining prospects for
expanding judicial review to normative documents).
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in his own case,” the adjudicator should not be the original agency
decision-maker. Hence, under the Administrative Reconsideration
Law (“ARL”),4 passed by the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress in 1999, a citizen who considers his or her rights
impinged upon by an administrative decision may generally seek
reconsideration from the relevant administrative agency at the next
higherlevel (a “reviewing agency”).5
It should be emphasized that, under Chinese law,
administrative reconsideration is not usually a compulsory
preceding step to initiating administrative litigation. There is no
4
Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (中华人民共和国行政复议法)
[Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) 1999STANDING COMM. NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 3 (China) [hereinafter ARL]. Before passage of the ARL,
administrative reconsideration had been governed by the Regulation on Administrative
Regulation. Xingzheng Fuyi Tiaoli ( 行 政复 议条 例) [Regulation on Administrative
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 24, 1990, effective Jan. 1, 1991,
amended Oct. 9, 1994) 1994 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 24 (China).
5
It can be very complicated to determine the reviewing agency in China because of
the complexity of administrative organization. The following considerations may assist in
identifying the three main types of reviewing agency: 1) If the original agency decisionmaker is a government below the provincial government, the reviewing agency should be
the government at next higher level.Specifically speaking, the decision made by the
township-level government, reviewing agency should be the county-level government;
decision by county-level government, reviewing agency municipal government; decision
by municipal government, reviewing agency provincial government. 2) If the original
agency decision-maker is a department of the government, the determination of reviewing
agency should be based on the nature of the department. In many circumstances, there are
two reviewing agencies: the government at the same level and the competent department at
next higher level. The citizen can make a choice from two. For example, the decision made
by the public security bureau of the county government, the reviewing agency can be the
county government or the public security bureau of the municipal government.However,
for the department that exercises vertical leadership over the customs, banking, national tax
and foreign exchange administration or by a state security organ, the reviewing agency
should only be competent department at next higher level. For example, the decision made
by a national taxation bureau located in the county, the reviewing agency should be the
national taxation bureau located in the municipality, not the county government. 3) In some
circumstances, the original decision-maker is still the reviewing agency. If the decision
made by a department under the State Council or by the provincial government, the citizen
should apply to the decision-maker. For example, a citizen who is unsatisfied with the
decision taken by the Ministry of Education, he or she should still apply to the Ministry of
Education (not the State Council) for administrative reconsideration. See ARL, supra note
4, art. 12–14 (stating that the needs of the people thatare taken into consideration in
Administrative Reconsideration Law).
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doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in China: an aggrieved party is
not required to exhaust administrative reconsideration before
seeking judicial review.6The ALLadopts the principle of individual
freedom of choice in delineating the relationship between
administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation. Based
on Article 44 of the ALL and other relevant statutes, there are only
some circumstances where a person—be it a legal person or an
organization—who is unsatisfied with an administrative decision
must apply for administrative reconsideration first,before continuing
to challenge the relevant administrative decision through
administrative litigation. 7 It is only in even more limited
circumstances—as provided for by specific laws of the National
People’s Congress or its Standing Committee—that reconsideration
decisions are deemed to be final.8
Compared with administrative litigation, administrative
reconsideration has some structural advantages for resolving
disputes. First, administrative reconsideration permits review of a
broader range of administrative decisions. Not all administrative

6

In recent years, however, some scholars have advocated carrying out “compulsory
reconsideration first” in order to make administrative reconsideration become the main
forum for resolution of administrative disputes. See, e.g., Zhou Lanling ( 周 兰领 ),
Xingzheng Fuyi Qiangzhi Qianzhi Moshi de Chongjian(行政复议强制前置模式的重建)
[Reconstruction of Model of Compulsory Choice of Administrative Reconsideration], 4
CHANG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) 63 (2008) (China) (hypothesizing using
compulsory reconsideration to facilitate the efficiency of determining the outcome of
administrative disputes and proposing it as an improved model). Other scholars object to
this idea. See, e.g., Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Fuyi Qianzhi Yihuo Ziyou Xuanze—Woguo
Xingzheng Fuyiyu Xingzheng Susong de Guanxi Chuli (复议前置抑或自由选择—我国行
政复议与行政诉讼关系的处理)[Reconsideration First or Free Choice—Treatment of the
Relationship between Administrative Reconsideration and Administrative Litigation in
China], 2 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU 71 (2012) (advocating against using compulsory
reconsideration).
7
Per relevant provisions of laws or regulations. Such laws and regulations cover
administrative decisions relating to taxation, collection of customs duties, payment of
social insurance premiums, trademark registration, examination of patent, etc. It is hard to
summarize the underlying standards that apply here, requiring administrative
reconsideration to be sought first.
8
See, e.g., ARL, supra note 4, art. 30 (detailing the specifics of the law).
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disputes are justiciable under the Administrative Litigation Law.9
Thus, reviewability of administrative decisions has been a very
important (and hotly discussed) academic and practical issue in
China. But it is generally accepted that the scope of review in
administrative reconsideration is wider than in administrative
litigation.
Second, administrative reconsideration permits deeper
intensity of review of administrative decisions. In administrative
litigation, courts can only review the “legality” of administrative
decisions, generally speaking;10 in administrative reconsideration,
the reviewing agency has the power to review both the legality and
the reasonableness of the administrative decision.11 In other words,
the authority of reviewing agencies extends to “merit review.”
Furthermore, reviewing agencies can substitute their own decision
for the decision made by the original agency decision-maker; formal
remand is unnecessary.12
Third, administrative reconsideration features relatively
lower costs and quicker results. Unlike courts in administrative
litigation, the reviewing agency cannot charge fees from applicants
for administrative reconsideration. 13
Although professional
representation is not required either in administrative litigation or
administrative reconsideration, it is more feasible for aggrieved
9

Currently, some administrative decisions are precluded from administrative
litigation, such as state acts in areas like national defense and foreign affairs, and personnel
decision involving civil servants. ALL, supra note 3, art. 13.
10
See ALL, supra note 3, art. 6, 70, 77 (examples of references to the legality of
administrative decisions).
11
See ARL, supra note 4, art. 1, 28 (examples where both legality and reasonableness
are taken into consideration).
12
According to article 28 of the ARL, the reviewing agency has power to nullify,
change or deem illegal a specific administrative act if it is taken in one of the following
circumstances: 1) the main facts are not clear, and essential evidence is inadequate; 2) the
basis is used incorrectly; 3) statutory procedures are violated; 4) authority is exceeded or
power is abused; or 5) the act is obviously inappropriate. ARL, supra note 4, art. 28.
13
See ARL, supra note 4, art. 39 (stating that when accepting an application for
administrative reconsideration, the administrative reviewing agencies may not charge the
applicant any fee).
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citizens to represent themselves in the administrative
reconsideration process. Administrative reconsideration procedures
are relatively simple and streamlined. The basic idea behind these
arrangements is to encourage citizens to make use of administrative
reconsideration.14
Despite these advantages, administrative reconsideration has
not met expectations in terms of public trust and support. Indeed,
its poor performance is often cited in critical analysis of the many
complaints and disputes in China in recent years. 15 As an
alternative and less onerous dispute resolution procedure,
administrative reconsideration should handle many more
administrative disputes than are processed through litigation.
However, that has not proven the case, as the following table
indicates:

Table I: Administrative Reconsideration &Administrative Litigation
Cases, 2000–200716
14

See Ying Songnian (应松年), Ba Xingzheng Fuyi ZhiduJianshe Chengwei Woguo Jiejue
Xingzheng Zhengyi de Zhuqudao(把行政复议制度建设成为我国解决行政争议的主渠
道) [Build Administrative Reconsideration into the Main Channel to Settle Administrative
Disputes], 5 FAXUE LUNTAN1, 8 (2011) (stating that administrative disputes should
consider administrative reconsideration as a natural part of the process to resolution).
15
See Hu Kui & Jiang Shu, Xinfang Hongfeng(信访洪峰)[The Flood of Xinfang], 4
LIAOWANG DONGFANG ZHOUKAN 1, 32–35 (2003) (describing the grim situation regarding
a large number of disputes and xinfang cases China was faced with in 2003). The number
of administrative reconsideration cases is much less than the number of xinfang cases. See
Ying Songnian (应松年), Xingzheng Fuyi Yingdang Chengwei Jiejue Xingzheng Zhengyi
de Zhuqudao( 行 政 复 议 应 当 成 为 解 决 行 政 争 议 的 主 渠 道 ) [Administrative
Reconsideration Should Become the Main Forum of Resolution of the Administrative
Disputes], 12 XINGZHENG GUANLI GAIGE 1, 49 (2010) (arguing that administrative
reconsideration should have a much more important role in settling administrative
disputes).
16
ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN(中国法律年鉴) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 1256
(2001)[hereinafter LAW Y.B. CHINA]; LAW Y.B. CHINA 1238 (2002); LAW Y.B. CHINA
1319 (2003); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1054, 1071 (2004); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1064, 1079 (2005);
LAW Y.B. CHINA 988, 1007–08 (2006); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1065, 1085 (2007); LAW Y.B.
CHINA 1016, 1134–35 (2008); Liu Xin (刘莘), Xingzheng Fuyi de Dingwei Zhizheng(行政
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2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

74,448

80,857

74,168

75,918

81,833

90,624

91,667

85,587

85,760

100,921 80,728

87,919

92,613

96,178

95,617

101,510

The table shows the caseload for administrative
reconsideration generally has been less than that for administrative
litigation, 18 and certainly much lower than might be expected.
These numbers illustrate that administrative reconsideration has not
served as the primary means for resolving administrative disputes
and redressing citizen grievances in China. Again, Chinese law
generally does not require exhaustion of remedies before citizens
may file for administrative litigation. But citizens who do file for
administrative reconsideration first—whether at their own discretion
or following certain statutory requirements—almost always retain
the right to appeal the result of the reconsideration proceeding
through administrative litigation.19 Even so, this benefit has not
proven sufficient to incentivize administrative reconsideration as a
preferred way to challenge administrative decisions. Indeed, in
2006 it was reported that as many as 70% of administrative

复议的定位之争) [The Discussion of the Position of Administrative Reconsideration], 5
FAXUELUNTAN1, 11–15 (2011).
17
These figures for administrative litigation only include first-instance cases, and not
second-instance cases.
18
From 2008 to 2012, and particularly during 2010–2012, the number of
administrative reconsideration cases tended to increase (to more than 100,000 cases per
year), but still remained less than the number of administrative litigation cases (which rose
to more than 120,000 cases per year). For more details, please see infra Part III Table 2
(explaining the numbers with more specificity).
19
See ALL, supra note 3, art. 44 (stating that filing for administrative reconsideration
does not bar the ability to appeal the result through administrative litigation).
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litigation cases involved no prior claim for administrative
reconsideration.20
In considering that statistic, it should be noted that, from
2003 to 2006, China experienced a flood of disputes and grievances,
including complaints against administrative agencies. 21 It is
unfortunate that administrative reconsideration did not play a more
active role in the resolution of such complaints. Apparently, most
claimants preferred to use informal, non-law based remedial
channels, especially “letters and visits” (xinfang).22
What all this clearly shows is that the above-mentioned
advantages of administrative reconsideration were mostly illusory
for most citizens. They did not believe that administrative
reconsideration could bring them justice. Hence, the mechanism of
administrative reconsideration was in a state of crisis, marked by
public distrust.

II. A NEW EXPERIMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE
RECONSIDERATION COMMITTEES
Confronted with this situation, some agencies tried to make
changes to improve the fairness of administrative reconsideration
and win the public’s trust. For example, some local governments
held public hearings in administrative reconsideration cases. 23
20

Li Li(李立), Qi Cheng Xingzheng Susong Anjian Suqian Wei Jingguo Xingzheng
Fuyi (七成行政诉讼案诉前未经行政复议) [Seventy Percent of Administrative Litigation
Cases are without Administrative Reconsideration], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec. 4,
2006,
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2006-12/04/content_475926.htm
[perma.cc/JM9P-FZGW].
21
See, e.g., Lianjiang Li et al., Petitioning Beijing: The High Tide of 2003–2006, 210
CHINA Q. 313, 313–14 (2012) (describinga “high tide” of petitioning the government from
2003 to 2006).
22
Id.
23
See, e.g., Li Li, Yinling Shehui Tongxiang Gongping Zhengyi Hexie: Xingzheng
Fuyi Gongzuo Zuotanhui Fayan Zongshu (引领社会通向公平正义和谐: 行政复议工作
座谈会发言综述) [Leading Society Toward Fairness, Justice and Harmony—Summary of
Speeches at the Administrative Reconsideration Forum], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec.
5,
2006,
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/zhuanti/hxsh/txt/200612/05/content_7459010.htm [perma.cc/AG94-R2W8] (describing an Administrative
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These efforts pushed forward the development of administrative
reconsideration, but they were sporadic, and did not remove the key
factors limiting the fairness of the procedure or otherwise provoke
any basic changes.
Some essential criteria for successful complaint systems
include independence, accessibility, clarity of jurisdiction, fairness,
and effectiveness. Although different theorists may prioritize these
criteria differently, independence is always high on the list.24 The
greatest defect of the present administrative reconsideration system
in China is precisely that—lack of independence.25 Superficially,
the reviewing agency, as a higher-level agency, is independent of
the original agency decision-maker, but of course the two levels
work closely with one another, fueling the popular perception that
“officials shield one another.” More problematic is the lack of clear
separation between the adjudicative and administrative functions
within the reviewing agency. As a consequence, reviewing agencies

Reconsideration Forum and providing summaries of speeches exhibited there); Li Li,
Jiangsu Quanmian Tuixing Xingzheng Fuyi Zhizheng Tingzheng Zhidu (江苏全面推行行
政复议质证听证制度) [Jiangsu Fully Carried Out the Cross-examination and Hearing in
the Administrative Reconsideration Cases], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Jan. 8, 2007,
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2007-01/08/content_509148.htm
[perma.cc/N9CGKXC9] (providing examples of hearings in Administrative Reconsideration cases).
24
See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 422 (1997)
(stating different criteria, with independence as a major factor).
25
See, e.g., Zhou Hanhua ( 周 汉 华 ), XingzhengFuyiZhiduSifahua Gaige
JiqiZuoyong( 行 政 复 议 制 度 司 法 化 改 革 及 其 作 用 )[Judicial Oriented Reform of
Administrative
Reconsideration
and
its
Implications],
2
GUOJIAXINGZHENGXUEYUANXUEBAO1, 33–34 (2005) (pointing out that the present
administrative reconsideration system is designed as an administrative supervision system
and is therefore not separated from ordinary administrative activities); Wang Wanhua (王
万华), Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Xiugai de Jige Zhongda Wenti(行政复议法修改的几个重大问
题) [Several Major Issues in Amendment to Administrative Reconsideration Law], 4
XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU 80, 82 (2011) (arguing that the organization handling
administrative reconsideration cases is the ordinary administrative organization, which is
still subject to the administrative agency in many aspects, such as outlay, appointment of
staff, and assessment of work); Fang Jun (方军), Woguo Xingzheng Fuyi Zuzhi Gaige
Chuyi ( 我 国 行 政 复 议 组 织 改 革 刍 议 ) [On the Reformation of Administrative
Reconsideration Organization in China], 5 FAXUE LUNTAN16, 17 (2011) (arguing that the
organization handling the administrative reconsideration cases used ordinary
administrative procedure to solve disputes).
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tend to employ “administrative” ways of thinking about and
handling administrative disputes.
In September 2008, following the strong recommendation of
Chinese administrative law scholars, and in light of the experience
and practices of other countries,26 the Legislative Affairs Office of
the State Council (“State Council LAO”) promulgated the “Notice
on Trial Experimentation of Administrative Reconsideration
Committees in Some Provinces and Municipalities Directly Under
the Central Government” (“Notice”),27 introducing an experimental
reform designed to improve the independence of administrative
reconsideration. So-called “experimental reform” is a common way
to carry out trial reform in China, and is frequently used in the
social policy area. Under this approach, some representative cities
or areas are selected to test out the contemplated reform. After a
period of time, the outcome of the trial reform is evaluated, a
process that determines whether it will be adopted nationwide. This
approach to reform can help policy-makers avoid the potential
instability that might be caused by an immature plan of reform, and
26
In recent years, Chinese administrative law scholars have introduced and analyzed
foreign systems of administrative review, such as the U.S. administrative law judicial
system, U.K. administrative tribunals, South Korean administrative reconsideration, and
even the administrative appeal system of Taiwan.See, e.g., LÜ Yanbin (吕艳滨), Riben he
Hanguo de Xingzheng FuyiZhidu —Xingzheng Fuyi Sifahua Ruogan Shili (日本、韩国的
行政复议制度—行政复议司法化的若干实例) [Administrative Reconsideration System
in Japan and South Korea—Some Examples of Judicializing Administrative
Reconsideration], 1 HUANQIU FALÜ PINGLUN 7, 7–16 (2004) (analyzing the Japanese and
South Korean administrative reconsideration systems); Zheng Lei (郑磊) & Shen Kaiju (沈
开举), YingguoXingzhengCaipansuo de Zuixin Gaige Jiqi Qishi (英国行政裁判所的最新
改 革 及 其 启 示 ) [The Latest Reform and Enlightenment of British Administrative
Tribunals], 3 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU 127, 127–31 (2009) (presenting introductory
background and key points of British government reforms to the UK administrative
tribunal system in 2007).
27
Guowuyuan Fazhi Bangongshi (国务院法制办公室), Guanyu Zai Bufen Sheng
Zhixiashi Kaizhan Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui Shidian Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于在部
分省、直辖市开展行政复议委员会试点工作的通知) [Notice on Trial Experimentation
of Administrative Reconsideration Committees in Some Provinces and Municipalities
directly
under
the
Central
Government]
(Sept.
16,
2008),
http://fgs.ndrc.gov.cn/xzfy/200904/t20090417_273029.html
[perma.cc/2AWVDSPT][hereinafter Notice].
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also to uncover relevant problems and accumulate experience more
generally. Thus, in issuing the Notice, the State Council LAO
hoped to bring about a moderate and gradual reform.
The Notice’s main innovation is to establish administrative
reconsideration committees (“ARCs”), organs composed of two
kinds of members: full-time members drawn from the government
bureaucracy, and part-time members who are legal and other experts
drawn from institutions outside the administration. ARCs are
chaired, in principle, by the leading official (or their deputy) of the
same level of government; the vice-chair is the head of the samelevel legislative affairs office (fazhiban). These committees are
granted the power to discuss and decide administrative
reconsideration cases. At the same time, the Notice diminishes the
number of alternate reconsideration organsion the pilot areas within
particular government departments. 28 This effort to establish a
relatively unified model of administrative reconsideration may be
contrasted with the approach of the ARL, under which any
administrative agency except those at the lowest level may serve as
a reviewing agency. 29 Indeed, according to a recent NPC
investigation, there exist a total of 30,450 reviewing agencies at
local levels alone.30
28

The Notice states: “[o]n the basis of administrative reconsideration decisions made
lawfully in the name of administrative reconsideration agencies, resources concerning
administrative reconsideration should be reasonably integrated, and methods of accepting
and dealing with cases by pooling reconsideration resources should be actively
investigated.”Id. at art. 1(3).
29
As mentioned earlier, the reviewing agency, in principle, should be the
administrative agency at the next higher level; the original agency serving as the reviewing
agency is limited to high-level agencies, such as ministries of the State Council, and
provincial-level governments.
30
See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Zhifa Jianchazu
Guanyu Jiancha Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa ShishiQingkuang de
Baogao (全国人民代表大会常务委员会执法检查组关于检查《中华人民共和国行政复
议法》实施情况的报告) [Report on the Enforcement of Administrative Reconsideration
Law of the People’s Republic of China by the Law Enforcement Inspection Group of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress], Zhongguo Renda Wang(Dec. 24,
2013),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2013-12/24/content_1819964.htm
[perma.cc/P758-DCMY] [hereinafter Enforcement of Administrative Reconsideration Law]
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On its own terms, what is most distinctive about the ARC
model is that it invites scholars and experts from outside the
administration, as part-time members of the committee, to take part
in the discussion and even the resolution of administrative
reconsideration cases. Thus, it brings an outside element and power
into the adjudicative process, using this externality both to improve
the quality and demonstrate the independence of administrative
reconsideration. Of course, this independence is not complete—
ARCs are still established within the relevant government authority,
and make a decision that ultimately has to be issued under the name
of that authority. Therefore, the independence of ARCs is moderate,
rooted in separating the adjudicative function from the
administrative function within the government.
The Notice identified eight provinces and municipalities that
would carry out this experimental reform of administrative
reconsideration. 31 In turn, these provinces and municipalities
selected a total of thirty-five pilot areas to undertake the task. Over
time, these numbers gradually increased so that by the end of 2011
there were a total of 108 pilot areas, distributed over 19provinces
and municipalities, implementing the Notice’s provisions.32 These
provinces and municipalities were authorized by the Notice to draw
up their own specific plans for ARCs based on local needs and
circumstances. In practice thus far, two versions of ARCs appear to

(detailing the NPC investigation and stating the expansiveness of number of reviewing
agencies).
31
These provinces and municipalities are Beijing, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong,
Henan, Guangdong, Hainan, and Guizhou. The Notice also suggests that other regions may
also conduct trial experimentation along these lines. See Notice, supra note 27, art. 2
(stating the possibility of conducting the trial experimentation).
32
See Zhang Yang & Cai Changchun, Shijiu ge Shengfen Yilingba ge Danwei You le
Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui (19 个省份 108 个单位有了行政复议委员会) [108 Pilot
Areas in 19 Provinces and Municipalities Established Administrative Reconsideration
RIBAO
(Mar.
28,
2012),
http://www.lawCommittees],
RENMIN
lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/fzjd/20120328163942.htm [perma.cc/UDX8-XMZH] (explaining
the number and distribution of the pilot areas).
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have been implemented: (1) the “unified” (jizhong) ARC model,
and (2) the “panel discussion” (heyi) ARC model.
Under the “unified” ARC model, all or most administrative
reconsideration cases at a particular level of government are
accepted, heard, and even finally decided by the ARC established at
that level.33In other words, different government departments (or
branches) lose their separate authority to handle administrative
reconsideration cases. In some of the pilot areas where this model
has been implemented, the ARCs enjoy “final say” in their cases.
For example, in Harbin, the capital city of Heilongjiang Province, if
the head of the municipal government refuses to endorse the ARC’s
decision, the ARC can in effect overrule that refusal by re-affirming
its decision with a two-thirds majority. After re-affirming the
decision, the head of the municipal government can block the
ARC’s decision only by convening an executive committee meeting
(but this procedure has never been activated to date).34
Compared with the “unified” ARC model, under the “panel
discussion” ARC model, even more emphasis is placed on the
inclusion of outside legal experts (from universities, research
institutes, law firms, etc.) in the deliberations of the ARC, as parttime members. For example, the ARC of the Beijing municipal
government significantly involves its outside legal experts in
33
Local governments that follow this model include those of Harbin, Jinan, Jining
and Linyi. See Gao Fengtao, Chuangxin Xingzheng Fuyi Tizhi Jizhi Tuidong Xingzheng
Fuyi Weiyuanhui Shidian Gongzuo Shenru Kaizhan —Zai Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui
Shidian Gongzuo Xianchanghui Shang de Jianghua, (创新行政复议体制机制推动行政复
议委员会试点工作深入开展—在行政复议委员会试点工作现场会上的讲话) [Official
Speech on Administrative Reconsideration at On-site Meeting Concerning the Pilot Work
of the Administrative Reconsideration Committee in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province] (Aug.
5,
2010),
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/wjjjh/ldjh/201008/20100800260075.shtml
[perma.cc/5XAE-T4CF] (providing an example of an administrative reconsideration case
that has been accepted, heard, and decided by the ARC at the same level).
34
See Legislative Affairs Office of Harbin, The Achievements of the Work of the
Administrative
Reconsideration
Committee
in
Harbin
are
Obvious,
http://www.hrblaw.gov.cn/fb/5/101/2010/04/i13045.shtml (stating that the executive
committee meeting has not been convened to block ARC’s decision in the past, and
signifying this as a success).
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hearing administrative reconsideration cases. In ARC meetings,
these outside legal experts can not only give suggestions, but even
cast votes on the cases. In some circumstances, they can also
preside in public hearings of the ARC. However, in this model, the
ARC serves mainly as a consultative body that provides suggestions
to the reviewing agency, which retains final decision-making
authority.

III. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ARC MODEL
Even as implementation of the ARC model expands and
further develops with the general support of Chinese administrative
law scholars and the media, until now there has not been an overall
and systematic evaluation—official or unofficial—of this new
approach to administrative reconsideration in China. In offering a
preliminary assessment here, I argue that there are many potential
benefits to the ARC model.
First, the ARC model can resist a certain degree of
administrative pressure.
Part-time committee members, in
particular, will be more immune to administrative factors and
influences, and can render a relatively independent judgment. Fulltime committee members, then, can protect themselves behind the
part-time members when reconsideration decisions go against
agency decision-makers.
Second, the ARC model can improve the quality of
reconsideration decisions. Part-time committee members usually are
law professors, trial lawyers, or experts in other fields, who can
offer suggestions or opinions that are different from the views of
full-time committee members.
This open and wide-ranging
discussion lends itself to greater rationality in the decision-making
process in reconsideration cases.
Third, the ARC model may change public perceptions of
administrative reconsideration in China by opening up the decisionmaking process and bringing in fresh air and new energy. This may
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give the general public reason to believe that administrative
reconsideration will no longer be completely controlled by the
administration itself.
As the originator of this reform, the State Council LAO has
tried to keep track of its progress, and has noted some
achievements.35In recent years, some related changes have been
apparent, and it can be said that both the quantity of administrative
reconsideration cases and the quality of the administrative
reconsideration decision-making process have increased. For
example, in 2011, there was a marked increase in the number of
administrative reconsideration cases handled by provincial-level
governments.36In twelve provinces, there was an increase of more
than 10%; in another four provinces, the increase was by more than
40%. 37 In some pilot areas, the number of administrative
reconsideration cases has come to exceed the number of
administrative litigation cases. For example, in Weifang City,
Shandong Province, the ratio of administrative reconsideration cases
35
See, e.g., Gan Zangchun, Deputy Dir., State Council LAO, (以党的十八大精神为
指导努力推动行政复议工作创新发展——在 2012 年全国行政复议年度工作会议上的
讲话) [Official Speech on Administrative Reconsideration at the Annual National Work
Conference on Administrative Reconsideration] (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.chinalaw.
gov.cn/article/xzfy/wjjjh/ldjh/201303/20130300384783.shtml
[perma.cc/P7DK-YA93]
(updating on the progress of Administrative Reconsideration); Gao Fengtao, Deputy
Director, State Council LAO, (认真贯彻胡锦涛总书记重要讲话精神把行政复议打造成
为化解行政争议的主渠道——在 2011 年行政复议年度工作会议上的讲话) [Official
Speech on Administrative Reconsideration at the Annual National Work Conference on
Administrative
Reconsideration]
(Dec.
15,
2011),
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/wjjjh/ldjh/201201/20120100359445.shtml
[perma.cc/7UC6-RZB6] (summarizing the progress of Administrative Reconsideration and
proposing further reforms); Gao Fengtao, Deputy Director, (围绕主题主线扎实推进行政
复议工作创新发展——在 2010 年度行政复议工作会议上的讲话) [Official Speech on
Administrative Reconsideration at the Annual National Work Conference on
Administrative Reconsideration] (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/
wjjjh/ldjh/201101/20110100331743.shtml [perma.cc/75TA-7ZRK] (proposing reforms
with Administrative Reconsideration).
36
Li Li, Duodi Xingzheng Fuxi An Dafu Pansheng, Xinfang Liang Xiajiang(多地行
政 复 议 案 大 幅 攀 升 信 访 量 下 降 ) [Administrative Reconsideration Cases Increased
Dramatically and the Number of Xinfang Dropped in Many Places], FAZHI RIBAO (Nov. 25,
2011),http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2011_11/25/10895295_0.shtml[perma.cc/CY
L3-P8QA].
37
Id.
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to administrative litigation cases had been 1:2 before the State
Council LAO’s introduction of the ARC model, but as of 2011, the
ratio was 1.12:1.38
On September 2, 2013, the NPC Standing Committee
launched an inspection, under the direction of Standing Committee
Chairman Zhang Dejiang, on the implementation of the
Administrative Reconsideration Law. 39 Six sub-groups were
dispatched across China to conduct the investigation, and eight
provincial-level standing committees were delegated to perform the
same task within their own jurisdictions. 40 The report by the
inspection group, issued on December 23, 2013, noted the recent
increase in the number of administrative reconsideration cases, and
its greater correlation to the number of administrative litigation
cases. Indeed, in some provinces and with respect to some
departments, the number of administrative reconsideration cases has
even come to exceed that of first instance administrative litigation.
For example, the number of administrative reconsideration cases is
close to or even more than two times the number of first instance
administrative litigation cases in Heilongjiang Province, Shanghai
Municipality, and elsewhere.41
The following table shows the numbers of administrative
reconsideration cases and first instance administrative litigation
cases, respectively, from 2008 to 2012, in the aftermath of the State
Council LAO’s September 2008 Notice.

38

Id.
For a discussion of “law enforcement inspection”, seegenerallyYan Lin, The NPC
Standing Committee’s Law Enforcement Inspection Power: Brief History, Process, and
Main Functions, 11 U. PA. ASIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (explaining what a law
enforcement inspection entails, and providing examples).
40
Na Yang, Quanguo Renda Changweihui jiang Kaizhan Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Zhifa
Jiancha (全国人大常委会将开展行政复议法执法检查)[The Standing Committee of
National People’s Congress will Conduct the Investigative Research of the Enforcement of
Administrative Reconsideration Law], FAZHI RIBAO (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.
npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2013-09/03/content_1805301.htm [perma.cc/FP5X-KTD8].
41
Enforcement of Administrative Reconsideration Law, supra note 30.
39
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Table II: Administrative Reconsideration &Administrative
Litigation Cases, 2008–201442
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Administrative
Reconsideration

78,002

77,877

93,055

102,815

109,553

128,428

149,222

Administrative
Litigation

108,398

120,312

129,133

136,353

129,583

123,194

141,880

Meanwhile, there is evidence that reviewing agencies have
been more active in correcting the illegalities and irrationalities of
administrative decisions. For example, from January to October
2011, the government of Shanghai Municipality struck down the
challenged administrative decision in 32 reconsideration cases,
accounting for 14% of the 230 cases that were handled.43 Also in
2011, the government of Quzhou City, Zhejiang Province, struck
down the challenged administrative decision in 31 reconsideration
cases, accounting for 64% of the cases handled.44 In 2012, after an
agency wrongfully refused to release certain government
information to an individual, that person applied to the government
of Beijing Municipality to review the non-disclosure. The ARC of
Beijing Municipality arranged for two part-time members to preside
over the formal reconsideration hearing. After the hearing, these two
part-time members patiently explained the meaning of the relevant
articles of the Regulations on Open Government Information to the

42

LAW Y.B. CHINA 1000, 1026–27 (2009); LAW Y.B. CHINA 919, 945 (2010); LAW
Y.B. CHINA 1052, 1078–79 (2011); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1066, 1090–93 (2012); LAW Y.B.
CHINA 1210, 1236 (2013) ; LAW Y.B. CHINA 143, 1153 (2014); LAW Y.B. CHINA 1014,
1037 (2015).
43
Gao, supra note 33.
44
Gao, supra note 33.
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agency decision-makers, eventually persuading them to correct the
illegality.45

IV. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARC MODEL
Although the introduction of the ARC model generally has
been well-received, as implementation has gone forward, some
problems have come to light. For example, there is significant
variation between the different provinces and municipalities
selected to carry out this experimental reform. In some areas—
Beijing Municipality and Heilongjiang Province—the ARC model
has been put into effect in nearly all local governments.46 But in
many of the selected provinces and localities, the ARC model has
only been implemented in a few pilot areas. Meanwhile, there is
additional variation in the status and role of ARCs in different pilot
areas. In some areas, ARCs are accorded a very high status, and
charged with resolving almost all administrative reconsideration
cases. Elsewhere, ARCs are permitted to handle only a limited
subset of such cases.
In part, the caution reflected above is due to ongoing
concerns about the sustainability of the ARC model, and its ability
to effectively resolve administrative disputes. If the concerns
cannot be addressed or the ARC model is thought to be the good
solution, the legislature will definitely not tate the ARC modle as
breakthrough point of revisiving the ARL and the fundentmental
system of the ARL. So the concerns will affect and decide whether

45

See Office of ARC of the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality, Di ErJie
Beijing shi Renmin Zhengfu Xingzheng Fuyi Weiyuanhui Gongzuo Baogao (第二届北京
市人民政府行政复议委员会工作报告) [The Work Report of the Second ARC of the
People’s Government of Beijing Municipality] (May 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (detailing the report that was persuasive in correcting the illegality).
46
In Beijing, ARCs have been established in the governments of all of the sixteen
districts and counties, together with the government of Beijing Municipality. Id.In
Heilongjiang, ARCs have existed in all twelve municipal governments, as well as the
Government of Heilongjiang Province. Gao, supra note 33.
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ARC model can be adopted by new ARL, they are described in the
sections that follow.
A. What Should Be the Status of ARCs?
As previously mentioned, under State Council LAO’s
reform, two versions of ARCs have been formed in the pilot areas,
which can be characterized in terms of a “unified” (jizhong) ARC
model and a “panel discussion” (heyi) ARC model. Even under the
general, overall ARC model, there are important differences
between these two “sub-models” in terms of status and function.
Under the unified model, ARCs may serve as the true adjudicators
of administrative disputes and can be vested with final decisionmaking authority. On the other hand, ARCs set up according to the
panel discussion model serve mainly to offer suggestions to the
reviewing agency, which may well attach significant weight to those
suggestions, but still retain final decision-making authority.
The prevailing scholarly view is that the “unified” ARC
model is more ideal. After all, the process of administrative
reconsideration can truly be independent only when the
reconsideration committee is the actual decision-maker. The State
Council LAO appears to hold the same view, and to encourage local
governments to establish ARCs in this manner. Even then, however,
there remains a dilemma as to how precisely to structure the
relationship between the ARC (of a given province, municipality or
locality) and the chief executive of that level of government.
According to the State Council LAO’s September 2008 Notice,
ARCs are to be established under each level of government, and
their decisions can become effective only upon the endorsement of
the chief executive of that level of government (e.g., the provincial
governor).47 In theory, this arrangement could lead to difficulties, if

47

Notice, supra note 27.
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there is any difference of opinion in a particular case between an
ARC and the head of the same-level government.
Of all the pilot areas selected to implement the ARC model,
only the Harbin municipal government has developed a mechanism
to address this sort of conflict, specifically one that limits the power
of the government head to block the reconsideration committee’s
decision. 48 Wide adoption of this “Harbin approach” may be
unlikely, however, given resistance from local governments to the
diminution of their control over administrative disputes. And there
remains the broader resistance from local government departments
to the “unified” ARC model for the same reason.
B. Where Should ARCs Be Located?
A further related point that needs to be discussed is where
ARCs should be located within the government. To address this
question, it is useful first to analyze the nature of administrative
reconsideration as a process of review of government action.
In China, administrative reconsideration traditionally has
been considered to be a form of administrative supervision: just
another way for superior administrative agencies to monitor inferior
administrative agencies, with no real distinction or separation from
regular modes of administration. Simply put, administrative
reconsideration was thought to be “part of the machinery of
administration.” 49
The ARL largely reflects this
48

Seesupra Part II (describing the pilot areas and the current mode of solving these
conflicts).
49
FRANKS COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND ENQUIRIES, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND ENQUIRIES, 1957, Cmnd. 218, at 40–
41 (U.K.), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY BRITISH GOVERNMENT: I.
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 282 (Martin Minogue ed., 1977).The
report concluded that the tribunal should be an adjudicative body, rather than
administrative one, and should be fair, open and impartial. The report pointed out that
“[t]ribunals are not ordinary courts, but neither are they appendages of Government
Departments . . . We consider that tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery
provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of
administration.”Id.
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conceptualization.50 However, this notion has been criticized by
Chinese legal scholars, who argue that administrative
reconsideration should be seen as“machinery for adjudication,” or at
least a mixture of both supervision and remedy.51 With increased
recognition of the poor performance of administrative
reconsideration as a mechanism for resolving administrative
disputes, this academic view has grown in popularity, and provides
the theoretical underpinning for the State Council LAO’s
experimental reform.52
For many scholars, in order to draw out the nature of
administrative reconsideration as “machinery for adjudication,” it
would be advisable for reconsideration to be conducted by neutral,
court-like institutions external to the administration. But State
Council LAO’s Notice did not follow this approach. Rather, the
Notice requires that ARCs be established under administrative
authority—not unlike the model of administrative law judges in the
United States.53
50

During the drafting process for the ARL, the former director of the State Council
LAO, Yang Jingyu, commented that administrative reconsideration was basically
considered to be an “oversight system within the administration, whose purpose is to selfrectify errors[;]” hence it did not require any special and independent institution, and
especially should not follow judicial procedures. Jingyu Yang ( 杨 景 宇 ), Guanyu
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (Cao’an) de Shuoming(关于中华人民
共和国行政复议法(草案)的说明) [Explanation on Draft Administrative Reconsideration
Law of People’s Republic of China], NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (Oct. 27, 1998),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/06/content_5007101.htm [perma.cc/VN2UEGF8].
51
See, e.g., Jun Fang (方军), Lun Zhongguo Xingzheng Fuyi de Guannian Gengxin he
Zhidu Chonggou(论中国行政复议的观念更新和制度重构) [On the Change of Ideas and
Reconstruction of the System Concerning Administrative Reconsideration in China], 2004
HUANQIU FALU PINGLUN 39, 39–46 (2004) (arguing that administrative reconsideration
should be an important administrative remedy system with a dual nature: administrative
and judicial).
52
The Notice clearly states that “administrative reconsideration is an important
statutory channel of resolving administrative disputes, protecting lawful rights and interests
of citizens, pushing administrative agencies observing law, and doing the social
justice.”Notice, supra note 27 (author translation).
53
By contrast, Australia forbids the creation of multi-functional agencies that perform
both judicial and non-judicial functions. Likewise, in the UK, adjudicatory functions are
performed either by courts or free-standing tribunals.See Peter Cane, Understanding
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The problem, then, is how to separate the adjudicative
functions of ARCs from regular authority and processes within the
administration. There are two main possibilities. First, ARCscould
be established under the direct leadership of the chief executive of
that level of government, and otherwise made completely
independent of other government departments. In this scenario,
ARCs would enjoy their own working offices, separate from other
government departments. Alternatively, ARCs could be established
under the chief executive’s direct leadership, but would have their
working offices situated within that level of government’s
legislative affairs office (fazhiban). This second approach is the
prevailing practice in the pilot areas, and, from the perspective of
country-wide fazhiban, the more realistic one. However, in my own
view, given that fazhiban mostly serves to draft rules and review the
rulemaking of other government departments, the first approach is
superior.
C. Who Should Be the Full-time and Part-time Members of ARCs?
Needless to say, the identity and qualifications of both fulltime and part-time members of ARCs is an important issue that will
greatly influence both the status of ARCs and the quality of the
reconsideration that they offer. According to the State Council
LAO’s Notice, scholars and other experts from outside the
administration should be invited to become part-time members of
ARCs, working alongside the full-time members.54 However, the
Notice does not clarify what proportion of committee members
should be “part-time.” Also, the Notice does not address the
qualifications of full-time members.
Administrative Adjudication, in ADMINISTRATION LAW IN A CHANGING STATE: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF MARK ARONSON 273, 282 (Linda Pearson et al. eds., 2008) (juxtaposing the
differences in several countries’ separation of judicial and non-judicial functions).
54
The Notice encourages the pilot places to “make full use of the role played by the
scholars, experts and other social resources.”See Notice, supra note 27 (author translation)
(encouraging collaboration and all who can help to work together).
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On the first issue, some scholars argue that part-time
members should account for well over half of all committee
members, because this would help to mitigate interference from the
administration and better safeguard the independence of the
reconsideration process.55This is a compelling argument. However,
it may be difficult for county-level governments,56 particularly in
rural areas, to make such provisions. If this rule were to be adopted,
it would be important to permit some exceptions, at least for a given
period.
According to preliminary statistics compiled by the State
Council LAO, there were a total of only 1,532 full-time ARC
members throughout the country by the end of 2011. 57 This
suggests that, to a large extent, civil servants must be handling
administrative reconsideration cases alongside other duties. As to
the qualifications of the full-time committee members, the
Regulation
on
Implementation
of
the
Administrative
Reconsideration Law, issued by the State Council in 2007, provides
that “specialized personnel for administrative reconsideration
should possess the qualities, expertise and capabilities that are
appropriate for performing their responsibilities for administrative
reconsideration, and shall have obtained relevant qualifications.”58
The regulation further stipulates that more “specific rules shall be
55
See, e.g., Xin Liu (刘莘), Xingzheng Fuyi de Dingwei Zhizheng(行政复议的定位
之争) [On the Discussion of Position of Administrative Reconsideration], 26 FAXUE
LUNTAN 10, 11–5 (2011) (discussing the independence of the reconsideration process as an
outstanding issue).
56
In China, there are four main levels of sub-national government: provincial,
municipal, county, and township. According to the ARL, township-level governments may
not serve as reviewing agencies for the purposes of administrative reconsideration.See
ARL, supra note 4, art. 12-15 (prescribing the determination of reviewing agencies for
administrative reconsideration).
57
See Yang &Cai, supra note 32 (detailing the total full-time ARC members and
putting that number in perspective as being extremely low).
58
See Xingzheng Fuyi Fa Shishi Tiaoli (行政复议法实施条例) [Regulation on
Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the State
Council, May 23, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2007) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S
CONG. GAZ. 20, art. 4 (promoting scholarship and the gaining of other necessary skills to
benefit the administrative reconsideration process).
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made by the legislative affairs department of the State Council in
conjunction with other relevant authorities of the State Council.”59
To date, no such rules have been issued. Consequently, ordinary
civil servants without legal qualifications can become full-time
members of reconsideration committees—which would seem to
undercut the main purpose of the ARC model, to improve the
quality of reconsideration decisions.
D. How Does the New Arrangement that Reviewing Agency Should
Basically Serve as the Defendant in Administrative Litigation
Influence ARCs?
In Chinese administrative law, administrative litigation is the
formal remedy of last resort, by which I mean that citizens who are
dissatisfied with administrative reconsideration decisions usually
retain the right to pursue administrative litigation next. In those
circumstances, there would be two administrative agencies involved
in the case: both the original agency decision-maker and the
reviewing agency. Determining which agency should then serve as
the defendant in the administrative lawsuit is an important and
difficult issue.
The original ALL took a complex position, where
determination of the defendant depended on the nature of the
reviewing agency’s decision. There are three potential types of
decision by the reviewing agency in a reconsideration case:
confirmation, modification (including reversal and alteration), and
omission (i.e., refusal to accept the case, or no decision). In the first
circumstance, where the reviewing agency has re-affirmed the
challenged agency decision, the original ALL stipulated that the
defendant and the primary target of judicial review should be the
original agency decision-maker. 60 In the second circumstance,
59

Id.
See ALL, supra note 3, art. 25(“Regarding a reconsidered case, if the
reconsideration organization upholds the original specific administrative act, the
60
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where the challenged agency decision has been modified in the
administrative reconsideration process, the original ALL stipulated
that the defendant in subsequent litigation should be the reviewing
agency, its reconsideration decision becoming the focus of judicial
review.61 In the third circumstance, where the reviewing agency has
either refused to accept the case or made no reconsideration
decision, determination of the defendant was left to the plaintiff’s
discretion, and the suit could be filed against the original agency
decision-maker or against the reviewing agency for its failure to
act.62
The key purpose underlying this complicated arrangement
was to maintain a balanced administrative law caseload among the
different levels of the Chinese judicial system. However, this
arrangement caused an unexpected and troubling result: reviewing
agencies tended just to confirm the original agency’s decision in
order to avoid becoming the target of an administrative lawsuit.63 In
China, there are many factors that make agencies want to avoid
becoming a defendant in a lawsuit. Among these are entrenched
cultural norms, and the continuing aversion of Chinese people to
litigation.64 Although this sentiment is growing weaker over time, it
administrative organ that initially took the act shall be the defendant; if the reconsideration
organization has changed the original specific administrative act, the reconsideration
organization shall be the defendant.”).
61
Id.
62
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xingzheng Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi(最高人民法院关于执行中华人民共和国
行政诉讼法若干问题的解释) [The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of
Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Judicial Comm. of the Supreme People’s
Court, Nov. 24, 1999, effective Mar. 10, 2000) 2000STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S
CONG. GAZ. 3, art. 22 (describing the third circumstance).
63
See Fuyi Jiguan Gaibugai Zuoshang Beigaoxi(复议机关该不该坐上被告席)
[Should the Reviewing Agency Be the Defendant?], LEGAL DAILY, (July 4, 2010),
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/llyj/201007/20100700257526.shtml
[perma.cc/XJB3-TSQE] (reporting reviewing agencies’ choices to avoid becoming the
defendant in administrative litigation by confirming the original decision, and stating that
330 cases of 360 administrative reconsideration cases supported the original decisions).
64
See He Qinhua ( 何 勤 华 ), Fansong yu Yansong de Lishi Kaocha—Guanyu
Zhongxifang Falü Chuantong de Yidian Sikao(泛讼与厌讼的历史考察——关于中西方
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is still prevalent. Of course, the unwillingness of reviewing
agencies to risk becoming a defendant themselves may have been
based on many practical considerations as well. For example,
preparing to defend against a lawsuit consumes an agency’s time
and energy, and if the agency were to lose the case, it would bear
heavy costs.
Under the new ARC model, these problems were further
exacerbated. For example, in the circumstance where an ARC is the
actual adjudicator, but the decision is still credited to a reviewing
agency, the reviewing agency would be even more reluctant to play
the role of defendant in an administrative lawsuit. Many scholars
came to argue that the original agency decision-maker should
continue to be the defendant in administrative litigation subsequent
to administrative reconsideration, no matter what decision was made
by the reviewing agency in the interim. 65 But other scholars
objected to this argument, and recommended maintaining the status
quo,66 or even making the reviewing agency always serve as the

法律传统的一点思考)[Historical Study on Pro-litigation and Anti-litigation—Thoughts
on Legal Tradition between China and the Western Countries], 3 FALÜKEXUE1, 15 (1993)
(arguing that because of various factors, anti-litigation has prevailed in China since ancient
times).
65
For many scholars, under the new system of administrative reconsideration
committee, the ARC is a neutral adjudicator, not simply the administrative decision-maker.
Therefore, the decision made by the ARC is not an administrative act, but a quasi-judicial
decision. The original agency decision-maker should be the defendant. See Qing Feng&
Zhang Shuihai, Xingzheng Fuyi Jiguan Zai Xingzheng Susong Zhong Zuo Beigao Wenti de
Fansi(行政复议机关在行政诉讼中作被告问题的反思)[Reflection on the Administrative
Reconsideration Agency Being a Defendant in the Administrative Litigation], 1
XINGZHENGFAXUEYANGJIU1, 11–14 (2013) (stating that, with the reform of administrative
reconsideration system and judicialization of administrative reconsideration, reviewing
agencies should not continue to be defendants).
66
See Zhao Yuan, Jianxi Xingzheng Fuyi Jiguan de Beigao Diwei Wenti(简析行政复
议机关的被告地位问题)[On the Administrative Reconsideration Agency as Defendant], 4
HEBEI FAXUE155, 156 (2009) (arguing that no matter what the consequence of
reconsideration is, an arrangement in which the original agency or reviewing agency is a
defendant has many drawbacks and it is better to maintain the present arrangement with
some adjustments).
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defendant in administrative litigation (no matter what decision was
reached in administrative reconsideration).67
After hot debates, the amended ALL ultimately seems to
support the latter. The amended ALL dramatically changes the rule
of determination of the defendant subsequent to administrative
reconsideration. 68 As to three types of administrative
reconsiderationdecision
mentioned
above(confirmation,
modification and omission), the amended ALL maintainsthe old
arrangement of the determination of defendant for modification and
omission decisions, but completely changes the determination of
defendant for confirmation decisions; in this circumstance,
according to the amended ALL, the reviewing agency and the
original agency decision-maker should be the co-defendants in
administrative
litigation
subsequent
to
administrative
69
reconsideration. This means that the reviewing agency will
basically be the defendant in mostsubsequent administrative
litigation.
Until this arrangement, reviewing agencies are
experiencing the pressure of huge number of administrative
litigation cases. In 2015, Courts at all levels heard 241,000
67

Supporters of this view believe that this arrangement will strengthen the
responsibility for the reviewing agency. Should the Reviewing Agency Be the
Defendant?,supra note 63.
68
ALL, supra note 3, art. 26. As for these changes and the relevant comments, see
Liang Fengyun(梁凤云), Xingzheng Fuyi Jiguan Zuowei Gongtong Beigao Wenti Yanju:
Jiyu Lifa he Shifa de Kaoliang (行政复议机关作共同被告问题研究——基于立法和司
法的考量)[Research on Issues about Administrative Reconsideration Agency as Codefendants: Based on both Legislative and Judicial Reconsiderations]，6 ZHENGFA
LUNTAN （政法论坛）[RIBUNE OF PLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW], 122-135, (2016)
( analyzing the reasons of the change and supporting the change.) Shen Fujun(沈福俊),
Fuyi Jiguan Gongtong Beigao Zhidu zhi Jianshi(复议机关共同被告制度之检
视)[Analysis on System of Reconsideration Agency as Co-defendants] 6 FAXUE (法学)
[LAW SCIENCE], 108-118, (2016) (analyzing the practical influences of the change and
criticizing the change.)
69
Article 26 of the amended ALL provides “Regarding a reconsidered case, if the
reconsideration organization upholds the original administrative act, the administrative
organ that initially took the act and the reconsideration organization shall be the codefendants; if the reconsideration organization has changed the original administrative act,
the reconsideration organization shall be the defendant.” Amended ALL, supra note 3, art.
26..
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administrative litigation cases of first instance and concluded
199,000 cases, up by 59.2% and 51.8% respectively over 201470.
The cases of reviewing agencies as the defendants account for a
large proportion. So, the reviewing agencies have to spend more
time in dealing with the administrative litigation. The following
sentence gives the vivid description of workload: “The reviewing
agency is either in the courtroom for answering the administrative
litigation case or on the way to the court in order to prepare for
answering the administrative litigation case ” 71 . As a result,
reviewing agencies have not enough time and energy to hear the
administrative reconsideration cases. Ever if they hear, they may
tend to diminish the role of ARCs in order to strengthen the control
the administrative reconsideration or to save the time.

V. THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSIDERATION IN
CHINA
In early 2010, the State Council decided to list revision of
the Administrative Reconsideration Law on its legislative agenda,
and instructed its Legislative Affairs Office to prepare draft
amendments. 72
Subsequently, the State Council LAO
70 See Zhou Qiang(周强), President of the Supreme People's Court（最高人民法院院长）
，Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Court, delivered at the Fourth Session of
the Twelfth National People's Congress (最高人民法院工作报告——2016 年 3 月 13 日
在第十二届全国人民代表大会第四次会议上) (March 13, 2016),
http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/2016/MAGAZINES_0919/5652.html.
71
See Shen Fujun(沈福俊), Fuyi Jiguan Gongtong Beigao Zhidu zhi Jianshi(复议机关共
同被告制度之检视)[Analysis on System of Reconsideration Agency as Co-defendants] 6
FAXUE (法学) [LAW SCIENCE], 108-118, (2016)
72
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the
Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, and the special committees of the National People’s Congress may submit to
the National People’s Congress legislative bills, which shall be put on the agenda of a
session by decision of the Presidium. Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated
by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul. 1, 2000), 2000 STANDING COMM.
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 2,art. 12. The State Council, the Central Military Commission,
the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate or a special committee of
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commissioned a group of administrative law scholars to provide
“experts’ draft amendments” within one year. The ARC model
served as the basis for the proposed draft amendments that
eventually came out of that expert group’s deliberative process.73
After several years of waiting, the Report on the Work of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”),
delivered by Chairman Zhang Dejiang of the NPC Standing
Committee on March 9, 2014 for review at the Second Session of
the 12th NPC and adopted on March 13, 2014, clearly said that
revision of the Administrative Reconsideration Law will be the
2014 agenda of the NPC Standing Committee.74 Thereafter, the
revision of the Administrative Reconsideration Law was listed in
the legislative plan of 2014 of the NPC Standing Committee.
According to the plan, the NPC Standing Committee will finish the
first reading the draft amendment of the Administrative
Reconsideration Law. 75 This indicates that the NPC Standing
the National People’s Congress may submit a legislative bill to the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress. Id. at art. 24. Consequently, the State Council has the
power to put forward the legislative bill about amendments to the ARL to the National
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.Id.
73
The author, as a member of this expert group, participated in the group’s deliberations
and drafting process. The draft that was submitted to the LAO at the end of 2011 aims to
make administrative reconsideration the primary forum for resolving administrative
disputes in China by improving its independence, openness and fairness. Besides
supporting further development of the ARC system, other key elements of the experts’
proposed amendments include: (1) enlarging the scope of administrative reconsideration
cases to include all administrative decisions except those excluded by express statutory
provisions; (2) establishing a “public function test” to include decisions made by nongovernmental bodies exercising public functions; and (3) generally judicializing
administrative reconsideration procedures.
74
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongzuo Baogao (全国人
民代表大会常务委员会工作报告)[The Report on the Work of the Standing Committee of
the
National
People’s
Congress]
(Mar.
9,
2014),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_2/2014-03/17/content_1856100_4.htm.
75
See Xuewen Zhang, Wei Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Tigong Qiangyouli de Fazhi
Baozhang: Quanguo Renda Changweihui Chutai 2014 NianLifaGongzuoJihua (为全面深
化 改 革 提 供 强有 力 的 法制 保 障: 全 国 人大 常 委 会 出台 2014 年 立 法 工作 计 划)
[Providing Powerful Legal Guarantees for Comprehensively Deepening Reform:
Legislative Plan of 2014 of the NPC Standing Committee], 8 ZHONGGUO RENDA [NAT’L
PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS]
(2014),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/201405/14/content_1862889.htm.
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Committee has begun the revision of the ARL. However, the
progress was not smooth. The NPC Standing Committee didn’t
begin the first reading because it didn’t receive the Administrative
Reconsideration Law bill. In 2015 and 2016, the thing remained so.
As of this writing, it is difficult to predict when the revision of
Administrative Reconsideration Law will be the real agenda of the
NPC Standing Committee and to predict the outcome of ACRs.
The reason behind it is that it is hard to reach a consensus
about how to revise the administrative reconsideration system.
Because the administrative reconsideration committee system may
diminish administrative power in some circumstances and has some
above-mentioned concerns, it may not be the best choice. But it
seems to have not formed the best alternative until now. Any
legislative process requires complex bargaining between parties
representing different interests, and revision of the Administrative
Reconsideration Law will be no exception. The crucial step of
revision of the Administrative Reconsideration Law is to find an
equilibrium point between the different interests.
Undoubtedly, the ARC model still is an important choice. We
should give an overall assessment of trial experimentation with
ARCs and fully analyze the advantages and disadvantages of this
new model, and then decide the fate of ARCs and development
direction of the administrative reconsideration system.
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